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Over the course of his career, Professor Ronald Dworkin has earned a well-
deserved reputation as one of the most penetrating and eloquent critics of 
consequentialist theories of law, political morality, moral duties, and personal 
ethics.  In the ambitious and wide-ranging Justice for Hedgehogs, he offers an 
alternative approach.  Respect for human dignity, he says, entails two 
requirements: (1) self-respect, i.e., taking the objective importance of your own 
life seriously; and (2) authenticity, i.e., accepting a “special, personal 
responsibility for identifying what counts as success” in your own life and for 
creating that life “through a coherent narrative” that you have chosen.1  
According to Dworkin, these two principles of dignity do triple duty.  First, 
as a matter of personal ethics, they provide guidance about what we should do 
in order to live well.2  Second, they elucidate the rights that individuals have 
against their political community.3  And third, they account for the moral 
duties we owe to others.4 
The principles of dignity that Dworkin identifies might play a valuable role 
 
* Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, 
Boston University School of Law. 
1 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010) (Apr. 17, 2009 
manuscript at 128, on file with the Boston University Law Review). 
2 Id. (manuscript at 132). 
3 Id. (manuscript at 210). 
4 Id. (manuscript at 133). 
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in these first two domains.  But in this Comment, I will raise some doubts 
about the value of this “dignity framework” in the third domain, in explaining 
and grounding interpersonal moral duties.  Specifically, the principles of self-
respect and authenticity sometimes fail to justify the nonconsequentialist 
positions that Dworkin wishes to endorse.  Moreover, even when these 
principles do plausibly entail moral duties of a particular scope, that scope is 
often significantly weaker, or in some cases significantly stronger, than many 
nonconsequentialists would endorse. 
In this Comment, I will focus on three illustrations of these difficulties: 
Dworkin’s discussions of (1) the duty to rescue a stranger, (2) the duty not to 
create an unreasonable risk of harm to others, and (3) the doctrine of double 
effect. 
Let me begin by putting these issues into the broader context of Dworkin’s 
analysis of interpersonal moral duties.  Dworkin makes highly ambitious 
claims for his dignity framework, which, in his view, helps explain an 
enormous range of nonconsequentialist views about our moral rights and 
duties, including: 
 Why I am permitted to care more about my children than about yours;5  
 Why I am not required to undergo a significant sacrifice, such as 
volunteering as a guinea pig for a medical experiment, simply because 
this sacrifice is very likely to save many others from a similar risk of 
harm;6  
 Why I do not have a general duty to confer a benefit on others when 
they could benefit more from an opportunity than I would;7  
 Why I have only a limited duty to rescue a stranger from harm;8 
 Why, in a rescue situation where I could save either one person or two 
people in danger, (a) I am permitted to rescue only one, and (b) I am 
permitted to do so even if my reason for selecting that person is 
idiosyncratic;9 
 Why deliberately harming another is almost always impermissible 
while causing harm to another through competition is not;10 
 Why, in determining how much risk of unintended harm I may 
permissibly impose on others, we should not simply balance costs and 
benefits in an economic calculus, but should instead balance: (a) the 
extent to which taking a precaution against the risk will set back my 
plans and prospects, against (b) the extent to which not taking that 
precaution will set back the plans and prospects of potential victims;11 
 
5 Id. (manuscript at 176). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. (manuscript at 176-79). 
9 Id. (manuscript at 180-82). 
10 Id. (manuscript at 183-86). 
11 Id. (manuscript at 185-87). 
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 Why, generally speaking, killing someone is worse than letting him 
die;12 
 Why it is permissible to employ any of a wide variety of criteria for 
selecting one potential recipient of an organ transplant over another, 
but it is not permissible to kill a patient, even one who is already 
dying, in order to harvest his organ, even if this would save a potential 
recipient’s life;13 
 Why we would also not permit people to agree in advance to a “spare 
parts lottery” whereby they would allow others to kill them for their 
organs in order to save multiple lives;14 
 Why intentionally causing harm to another, either as a means or as an 
end, is generally more wrongful than knowingly causing the same 
harm as a side effect;15 
 Why corporal criminal punishment, which takes away the criminal’s 
control over his own body, is especially difficult to justify;16 
 Why any form of criminal punishment demands an especially 
compelling justification, for it permits the state to use the offender in 
an effort to deter others, and this is only permissible when the offender 
has genuinely forfeited the rights that his dignity would normally 
demand.17 
Dworkin also claims that his principles explain a number of plausible 
positions that appear to be justifiable only by consequentialist reasoning.  Of 
course, Dworkin would very much like to defend these positions on 
nonconsequentialist grounds.  Here are some illustrations: 
 Why it is permissible for one swimmer in danger of drowning to try to 
outrace another and secure a life vest that can save only one;18 
 Why it is preferable to save two drowning swimmers in one location 
rather than one in another, when you cannot save them all;19 
 Why, in such a case, it is not permissible to save one rather than two 
for no reason other than whim;20 
 Why it is permissible to turn a trolley so that it kills one person on the 
 
12 Id. (manuscript at 183-86). 
13 Id. (manuscript at 187-91). 
14 Id. (manuscript at 188-91). 
15 Id. (manuscript at 187-91). 
16 Id. (manuscript at 192). 
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. (manuscript at 180-82). 
20 Id. (manuscript at 181).  Dworkin thinks it obvious that saving two rather than one is 
the proper default choice, but he does not adequately explain why a weighted lottery (giving 
the single swimmer a one-third chance of being saved) is not an equally plausible default.  
See id. 
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spur rather than five on the track ahead.21 
There is much to admire in Dworkin’s analysis of these topics, including 
intriguing juxtapositions, and fresh and illuminating examples.  In this 
Comment, however, I only have space to discuss the three topics identified 
above: the duty to rescue a stranger; the duty not to create an unreasonable risk 
of harm to others; and the doctrine of double effect.  In each instance, 
Dworkin’s discussion contains valuable insights, but his analysis and 
conclusions do not flow easily from the dignity framework.  The core problem, 
we will see, is an unpersuasive extension of that framework from the domains 
of personal ethics and political morality to the domain of interpersonal moral 
duties. 
I. THE DUTY TO RESCUE A STRANGER 
Dworkin’s analysis of the duty to rescue a stranger is problematic in two 
main respects.  First, his framework suggests that the scope of the duty to 
rescue a stranger is extraordinarily weak, much weaker than many other 
nonconsequentialists would favor.  The framework implies that an actor need 
not rescue if this would interfere with his idiosyncratic projects (e.g., to build a 
temple to his god), so long as the stranger would not suffer serious harm if not 
rescued.22  Second, Dworkin asserts, without persuasive argument, that if the 
person in need of rescue is more identifiable, then one has a stronger duty to 
rescue him.23 
Let us consider Dworkin’s analysis in more detail.  He begins by resisting 
the argument for a very stringent duty to rescue.  A mere failure to help 
someone in need cannot, he says, “normally be interpreted as showing any lack 
of respect for the objective importance of . . . [the potential beneficiary’s] 
life.”24  The fact that I help my own children, but do nothing to help yours, is 
consistent with my recognizing the objective importance of your children.25  
Still, he cautions, one cannot completely ignore the claims of strangers.26  So, if 
someone is drowning and I can easily save them, I might have a moral duty to 
rescue.27 
What is relevant to the scope of that duty?  Three factors, according to 
Dworkin – a metric of harm to the victim, a metric of cost to the rescuer, and 
“confrontation.”28  But, Dworkin plausibly argues, if we are to provide a 
genuinely nonconsequentialist account of the duty, we cannot simply balance 
 
21 Id. (manuscript at 188). 
22 Id. (manuscript at 176-78). 
23 See id. (manuscript at 180-81). 
24 Id. (manuscript at 175). 
25 Id. (manuscript at 176). 
26 Id. 
27 See id. 
28 Id. (manuscript at 175-79). 
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harm and cost against each other in a utilitarian way.29 
What, then, is the proper nonconsequentialist analysis of these factors? 
A. The Metric of Harm to the Victim 
Dworkin argues that a high threshold must be surmounted before a duty to 
rescue is properly triggered: one has a prima facie duty to help a stranger only 
when he is in danger of death or of losing the capacity to function as a normal 
human being.30  The question, says Dworkin, is “whether denying him aid will 
make it impossible for him to pursue value in his life at all.”31 
This threshold requirement might well follow from Dworkin’s principles of 
dignity, since those principles insist on the overriding moral significance of a 
person’s ability to pursue objective value.32  But the requirement is extremely, 
and implausibly, restrictive. 
Suppose I know that the person in danger risks a broken leg but nothing 
worse.  I could save him yet face no risk of injury and no interference with any 
of my own important life plans.  It certainly seems that I should have a moral 
duty to aid; yet Dworkin’s analysis suggests that I do not.33 
Or suppose the harm is merely some form of temporary emotional distress.  
A snake, which I know is harmless, is terrifying a child.  I could easily pick up 
the snake and toss it out of sight.  Should I not do so? 
It is certainly plausible to believe that I should have a duty of easy rescue 
that is at least this robust.  And that belief can be justified on other than purely 
consequentialist grounds.  To be sure, libertarian nonconsequentialists do 
reject a duty to rescue.34  But not all nonconsequentialists are libertarians, and 
some indeed endorse such a duty.35 
 
29 See id. (manuscript at 176). 
30 Id. (manuscript at 176-77). 
31 Id. (manuscript at 177).  See also id. (manuscript at 176), where Dworkin asks whether 
“I have at least a prima facie duty to help a stranger when he is in danger of losing his life or 
becoming incapable of functioning as a normal human being?”  He later answers 
affirmatively.  Id. (manuscript at 177) (“We must ask . . . whether denying him aid will 
make it impossible for him to pursue value in his life at all.”). 
32 See id. (manuscript at 162-63). 
33 To be sure, there is some ambiguity here in Dworkin’s exposition: whatever the 
magnitude of the harm to the stranger, he says, my duty to prevent it “is greater when I can 
do so with less risk to or interference with my own life.”  Id. (manuscript at 177).  This 
might imply that he would require a more extensive duty to aid than is suggested in the text.  
But he also seems to assume that I only need to act if the harm is “serious.”  Id. 
34 Consider Richard Epstein’s early writings.  E.g., Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict 
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 197-99 (1973) (asserting that rejection of common law 
Good Samaritan doctrine and imposition of a duty to rescue would make it difficult to 
establish the “limits of social interference with individual liberty”). 
35 For example, many Kantian theorists endorse a duty of beneficence.  Corrective justice 
theorist Ernest Weinrib once endorsed a limited duty to rescue.  Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case 
for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 251 (1980).  Joel Feinberg suggests that a duty of 
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B. The Metric of Cost to the Rescuer 
This factor is also relevant, Dworkin argues.36  Here, again, Dworkin’s 
framework justifies only an extremely weak duty, because the framework will 
count as a serious cost whatever the rescuer takes to be a serious interference 
with his important personal projects, even if no one else would view the 
interference as a serious cost.37  As one illustration, Dworkin considers a 
rescuer who is building a temple to his god.38  Now suppose that this rescuer 
considers it critically important to finish building the temple by noon today 
rather than two minutes past noon, because his god will otherwise be intensely 
displeased.  Then presumably he need not stop and save the child from the 
terrifying snake, or from a broken leg, or perhaps even from a life-threatening 
injury.  This is not a very palatable conclusion.39 
Dworkin might respond that I am taking his analysis and examples too 
literally.  Perhaps we should be permitted to balance potential harm to the 
victim and cost to the rescuer more flexibly, according to some sort of sliding 
scale: if the potential harm to the victim is quite significant, then, unless the 
rescuer would incur comparably significant costs, he should still owe a duty of 
easy rescue.  Yet it is not clear whether Dworkin’s framework can justify this 
more flexible approach, an approach that seems to collapse into the type of 
utilitarian tradeoff that Dworkin undoubtedly means to reject.  Most charitably, 
we might assume that the more flexible metrics of harm to victim and of cost 
to rescuer would still be fundamentally calibrated by the two principles of 
dignity: both “harm” and “cost” would be defined substantially (though not 
exclusively, given the problems I have just identified) by the extent to which 
 
easy rescue is much more justifiable than a generalized duty to benefit others when one can 
easily do so, because the duty to rescue is one instance of a duty to prevent another from 
suffering harm.  See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, 130-50 (1984).  Note the criticism of 
Feinberg by Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, 
89 GEO L.J. 605, 627-30 (2001), who argues that failures to rescue are better understood as 
failures to benefit. 
36 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 177). 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  Dworkin takes this example from T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. 
PHIL. 655, 659-60 (1975) (“The fact that someone would be willing to forego a decent diet 
in order to build a monument to his god does not mean that his claim on others for aid in his 
project has the same strength as a claim for aid in obtaining enough to eat . . . .”).  Here, of 
course, Scanlon is arguing that the idiosyncratic preference of the person in need of aid 
(rather than the preference of the rescuer) is not morally decisive. 
39 It is possible that Dworkin’s theory has more bite, however, in situations where A’s 
reason for not aiding is neither (a) that aiding risks causing A significant harm (harm that 
could interfere with his general pursuit of his life projects), nor (b) that aiding would 
interfere with some specific project, such as completing his temple on time; but rather, 
where A’s reason for not aiding is just (c) that A does not want to be bothered.  Perhaps in 
such a case, A must rescue, at least if the interference with the rescuee’s life plans is serious 
enough. 
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they interfere with the life plans of the victim or of the actor.  Still, this revised, 
more flexible balancing approach leaves critical questions unanswered.  For 
example, does “substantially” mean “significantly”?  “Mainly”?  “Almost 
exclusively”?  I am not confident that Dworkin can formulate a coherent 
intermediate criterion, one that escapes both the Charybdis of implausible 
deference to idiosyncratic personal projects and the Scylla of unacceptable 
utilitarian balancing. 
C. “Confrontation” 
According to Dworkin, the third factor that is relevant to the scope of the 
duty to aid is “confrontation.”40  I have a stronger duty if either (a) the person 
in need of help is a particular, identifiable person, or (b) the need to rescue 
arises here and now, rather than at some physical distance or in the future.41  
We would display a “callousness that mocks any pretended respect for 
humanity,” says Dworkin, if we ignored the “impending death of a particular 
person dying in front of us.”42 
Dworkin points out that this third factor has “puzzled economists.”43  For 
example, if a cave-in traps a miner, he says we expect the community to 
“spend whatever further sums it takes” to rescue the miner.44  These sums 
could amount to much more than we expect the community to spend ex ante on 
mine safety in order to prevent cave-ins or other dangerous accidents from 
happening in the first place.45  Dworkin treats the economists’ bafflement at 
this disparate treatment as evidence that their cost-benefit analysis is out of 
tune with common sense intuitions, intuitions that are better explained by his 
nonconsequentialist principles of dignity.46 
But I think nonconsequentialists should also be more than a little puzzled by 
this phenomenon.  Why should we treat the identifiability of the victim as a 
moral feature of such dramatic significance?  Dworkin’s only argument for this 
position is that it is wrong to ignore the natural responses that a respect for life 
provokes when we are directly confronted with a person facing imminent 
death.47  But why give such enormous weight to that natural response, if, for 
example, we could save five miners from being trapped and killed in the first 
place, for every one trapped miner we spend enormous sums to rescue?  
 
40 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 178). 
41 Id. (referring to “particularization” and “proximity” as the elements of confrontation). 
42 Id. (manuscript at 179). 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  Dworkin’s assertion that we would pay “whatever further sums it takes” to save 
the trapped miner is an exaggeration.  Id.  We would not spend five-hundred million dollars 
to save a trapped miner; and we do call off rescues of missing persons when the chance of 
saving them is extremely low but greater than zero. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. (manuscript at 178-79). 
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Perhaps our reluctance to treat their lives with equal respect is just a failure of 
imagination.48 
Elsewhere in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin is exceedingly careful to 
distinguish between fact and value, following David Hume.49  Why is he so 
extraordinarily deferential to our “natural” reactions here?50  Could they not be 
irrational, or even morally indefensible, as so many of our instinctive and 
intuitive responses are?  Consider the equally “natural” phenomenon of 
disgust, which historically has played a troubling role in efforts to justify 
racism and homophobia.51 
Now, I concede that our intuitive response to the trapped miner is an 
understandable emotional reaction, and one that psychologists have empirically 
verified.  Researchers have discovered, for example, that if study participants 
are told, not just that a person in need is a child, but also the age of the child, 
they are more likely to help; and their readiness to help increases even further 
if the child is given a name.52  Perhaps evolutionary biologists can explain the 
adaptive value of such intuitions.  But the question remains: why should we 
give weight to such reactions in justifying a stronger moral duty to rescue?  A 
better explanation should be offered than the simple fact that the reaction is a 
“natural” one.  We might “naturally” feel more compassion towards someone 
if we know their first name, but that is hardly a justifiable basis for imposing a 
stronger moral duty to rescue such a person. 
Consider an analogous problem, the allocation of health resources to the 
terminally ill.  We currently allocate a huge amount of health expenditures to 
end-of-life care, when those dollars could save many more lives if invested in 
earlier prevention and treatment.53  Dworkin noted, in his Keynote Address at 
the Symposium, that in the type of hypothetical insurance market he favors, 
 
48 It almost seems that Dworkin embraces the intuition that identifiability of the victim is 
morally salient just because it is a telling counterexample to what economic analysis would 
suggest.  But, it hardly follows from the fact that economists and consequentialists would 
oppose a position, that nonconsequentialists should embrace it.  The enemy of my enemy 
need not be my friend. 
49 Id. (manuscript at 19). 
50 Id. (manuscript at 179). 
51 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 1-4 
(2004) (warning that the psychological reactions of disgust and shame, although 
unavoidable, should not be the foundation of legal rules, in part because of the risk this 
poses to stigmatized groups such as gays and the disabled). 
52 Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The “Identified Victim” Effect: An Identified Group, or 
Just a Single Individual?, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 157-65 (2005); see also 
Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism 
and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5-14 (2003) (finding that even “weak” 
identifiability increased the altruism of subjects). 
53 See Reed Abelson, Months to Live: Weighing Medical Cost of End-of-Life Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at A1 (referring to estimates that the United States could save $700 
billion a year by reducing costs of end-of-life care). 
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distributive justice would probably allocate these health dollars very 
differently.54  Yet the same could be said about the trapped coal miner.  In 
Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance market, we might well choose to invest more 
in prevention of coalmine disasters and relatively less in rescues of identified 
victims. 
Of course, one important reason that we do spend too much on end-of-life 
care is the factor of “confrontation” that Dworkin endorses.  Your dying 
mother or grandmother is in the hospital.  You want her to get the best possible 
care.  You do not want a government “death panel” to tell you what to do.55  
But again, does your natural feeling that society owes a special duty to 
improve the health of this identifiable person really provide a convincing basis 
for concluding that society indeed owes such a duty?  If $200,000 would either 
extend a terminally ill person’s life for a few months, or prevent several people 
from contracting a debilitating lifetime disease, is the latter allocation not more 
sensible and more humane? 
To be sure, these allocation decisions are complex, and their ethical 
resolution depends on more than simple cost-benefit analysis.  Distributive 
justice considerations are important, as is the moral obligation to continue the 
care of a patient whom one has started to serve, even in circumstances where 
discontinuing care and shifting resources to another patient would be more 
cost-effective.  More broadly, if you are “confronted” with specific individuals 
in need here and now, very often you have much more reliable grounds for 
judging that their need is genuine and compelling, that you can easily rescue 
them, that others cannot help, and so forth; as compared to the much less 
certain grounds you are likely to have for determining, ex ante, whether to take 
a precaution that might save a diffuse, unidentified class of individuals in the 
future.  But Dworkin’s endorsement of the “confrontation” factor does not rely 
on these contingent epistemic differences.  Rather, he claims that the 
identifiability and spatiotemporal proximity of a victim is an intrinsic moral 
difference.56  This contention needs much more argument. 
Finally, it is not even clear that Dworkin’s embrace of the “confrontation” 
position – such as the view that we should pay whatever is required to save the 
trapped coal miner – actually follows from his two principles of dignity.  True 
enough, our immediate emotional reaction when we witness the plight of 
particular individuals in dire need of rescue is that we should save them.  But 
Dworkin provides no argument to show that this altruistic impulse, together 
 
54 Ronald Dworkin, Keynote Address at the Boston University Law Review Symposium: 
Justice for Hedgehogs (Sept. 25, 2009) (transcript on file with the Boston University Law 
Review) (arguing that we should spend less “keeping people alive” at the end of their lives 
because people could spend that money on useful activities throughout life instead of 
financing expensive end-of-life care). 
55 See Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False ‘Death Panel’ Rumor Has Some Familiar 
Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A1. 
56 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 178-79). 
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with his two principles, entails a stronger moral duty to rescue those whose 
plight is staring us in the face.  He simply asserts that one displays a disregard 
for the objective value of human life if one fails to spend enormous sums on 
saving them, or if one fails to spend much more on saving them than on saving 
less identifiable individuals through prudent ex ante precautions.57 
II. THE DUTY NOT TO CREATE UNREASONABLE RISKS OF HARM TO OTHERS 
Let us turn to the second topic – the scope of the moral duty not to create an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others.  This is a topic that is of crucial 
significance to the proper scope of tort law, and of some significance to 
criminal law as well.  Here, too, Dworkin’s principles of dignity suggest a 
surprisingly narrow duty. 
In determining the scope of this duty not to cause unintended harm, we 
should not, Dworkin warns, simply engage in the sort of cost-benefit balance 
that economists and consequentialists would recommend.58  Although now is 
not the occasion for a full discussion of the problems engendered by a purely 
cost-benefit analysis of risky conduct, I share Dworkin’s reservations.59 
Trouble comes, however, when we examine the formula that Dworkin 
recommends in lieu of cost-benefit analysis.  He says we should balance:  
(a) the extent to which the plans and prospects of a potential injurer will 
be set back by his taking a precaution against risks  
against  
(b) the extent to which the plans and prospects of potential victims will 
be set back if the actor does not take that precaution (and thus increases 
the risk of injury).60 
 
57 Dworkin’s arguments about the scope of our duty to alleviate global poverty are 
similarly problematic.  See id. (manuscript at 179).  We do have such a duty, he says, given 
the high need under the first metric and the low cost under the second, but he believes that 
the factor of confrontation is still relevant: if we are more vividly aware of African poverty 
today than in years past, due to extensive media coverage, this “aggravate[s] [our] failure of 
duty” to respond to the problem, and we should feel more shame when we do not respond 
adequately.  Id. 
 But this view, taken literally, has bizarre consequences – for example, the greater the 
media coverage of a natural disaster or of a poverty problem, the more funds we are morally 
required to allocate towards alleviating the problem, even if we know that greater problems 
exist elsewhere that the media have not highlighted. 
58 See id. (manuscript at 187). 
59 Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer 
Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1188 (2008) (rejecting as “highly 
implausible” the use of unqualified consequentialist cost-benefit analysis as a criterion of 
tort negligence). 
60 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 186-87), stating that the Learned Hand test 
is the correct basic strategy for determining when risk-creation is permissible, but endorsing 
a restricted version of the test, under which we compare how much the actor’s projects and 
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But now we have a problem reminiscent of the problem we encountered 
with Dworkin’s analysis of the scope of the duty to rescue.61  Under this type 
of a balance, the subjective importance of the potential injurer’s own plans and 
projects will often override the rights of potential victims.  Specifically, it will 
override whenever the injury that the victims might suffer from the risky action 
is modest or short-lived enough that it will not interfere in a comparable way 
with the victims’ own long-term plans. 
Consider two examples.  First, recall the saga of our friend the temple-
builder, who was in such a great hurry to complete his monument by noon 
today.  Now suppose that our friend is stuck in an unforeseeably horrendous 
traffic jam.  Once the traffic clears, he drives at a very high speed to the site of 
his building.  Speeding is the only way he can arrive at his destination on time. 
Unfortunately, speeding will also terrorize dozens of young children along 
the way.  But, fortunately, their terror will only be momentary.  His speeding 
does not actually pose any risk of physical harm to them, and does not cause 
any long-term emotional harm.  So it does not set back their life plans or 
prospects in any way.  Still, is it really morally permissible for him to speed?  
And should he not have a moral duty to compensate them for their emotional 
harm?62 
Now consider a second example, my own variation on a famous example 
from T.M. Scanlon.63  Imagine Lopez is in the transmitter room of a television 
station.  Electrical equipment in the room poses a serious risk of falling on him 
and causing him extremely painful shocks, though it will cause no other harm.  
There is only one sure way to prevent him from suffering these shocks: turning 
off the transmitter for fifteen minutes while we fix the problem.  But the final 
match of the World Cup is in progress, watched by a huge number of people, 
and it will not be over for an hour.  Should we turn off the transmitter now, and 
save Lopez immediately?  Or should we instead wait until the match is over? 
Scanlon asks, in his similar example, an arresting question: “Does the right 
thing to do depend on how many people are watching – whether it is one 
million or five million or a hundred million?”64  Clearly, it does not.  The 
question nicely captures the nonconsequentialist intuition that it is not always 
permissible to harm someone, or even to risk harm to them, simply because the 
aggregate expected benefits derived from the conduct that causes or risks the 
 
plans are set back by taking a precaution, relative to how much not taking the precaution 
(and thus causing damage) would set back the projects and plans of others. 
61 See supra Part I. 
62 In tort law, of course, he would most likely not have a legal duty to compensate them, 
since liability for emotional harm alone is imposed only in narrow circumstances not present 
here.  See DAN B. DOBBS, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS § 302 (2001). 
63 For the original example, see T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 235 
(1998).  In Scanlon’s version, Jones is trapped under fallen equipment, and, in order to 
rescue him, we must turn off the transmitter for fifteen minutes.  Id. 
64 Id. 
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harm outweigh the expected costs.65  A huge number of tiny benefits might, on 
a utilitarian metric, have greater aggregate value than the disvalue of a single 
individual’s pain, and yet, in these examples, it is impermissible to choose the 
course of action that produces those greater benefits. 
Both Scanlon’s example and my example demonstrate that any balancing 
test for permissible risk imposition should include a constraint against this type 
of utilitarian aggregation.66  But I want to pose an additional question about my 
scenario.  Suppose that watching the World Cup live is extremely important to 
the life plans of some of the viewers, indeed one of the most important 
experiences in their lives.67  It would appear that under Dworkin’s view, such a 
setback to the plans and prospects of these viewers weighs heavily, and could 
easily override the substantial risk that Lopez might suffer significant but 
temporary pain if we do not turn off the transmission.68  For it is quite possible 
that the painful shocks that Lopez might suffer would set back his life plans 
very little, if at all.69 
The basic problem that both Scanlon’s example and my example reveal is 
this: Dworkin employs a criterion of permissible risk imposition that places too 
much value on whether the life plans of the relevant actors are substantially 
furthered or hindered.  Although these features might deserve some weight in 
the rescue context, it is not at all clear that they should be so decisive in the 
context of an actor imposing a risk of harm on a class of potential victims.  In 
this context, we need to weigh, not just what effect a rule permitting (or 
forbidding) risky activity will have on the life plans of potential injurers and 
victims, but also: (1) the way in which the benefits and burdens are distributed 
and (2) the social value of the activity.70  As a matter of personal ethics, it may 
be perfectly defensible for sports fans to devote significant portions of their 
time to rooting for the home team.  Indeed, such devotion might be laudable in 
many respects, for it might build community spirit and reinforce such values as 
valor, effort, discipline, self-sacrifice, and acceptance of defeat.  But it hardly 
follows that these values are entitled to significant social weight when pursuing 
them requires endangering the welfare of others.  By contrast, if the reason one 
is endangering others is to save one’s own life or the life of another person 
 
65 See id. 
66 As stated, Dworkin’s balancing test does not include such a constraint, though it would 
be easy enough for him to add one.  See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 187).   
67 This is not an unrealistic assumption, I think, in light of the maniacal behavior of 
sports fans around the world. 
68 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 187).   
69 Perhaps one could distinguish this second example from the first because the sports 
fans are not literally the injurers, but are people who benefit from the injurer (the TV 
station) not taking a precaution.  But I am not so sure that this matters.  Would it really 
make a moral difference if the TV station owner also was a rabid sports fan and considered 
this experience of watching the World Cup final the highlight of his year? 
70 Simons, supra note 59, at 1191-92, 1202-08. 
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(e.g., by transporting the needy person at high speed to the hospital), that 
reason has significant weight both in personal ethics and in interpersonal risk 
imposition. 
How would Dworkin respond to these criticisms?  Perhaps he would say 
that permitting either our friend the temple builder or the TV station owner to 
impose these risks on others is unjustly asking the victims to “subsidize” the 
injurer’s choice of life project.71  This is indeed a valid concern.  However, 
what counts as an unjust subsidy is a notoriously difficult inquiry,72 and it is 
not clear how one would apply the concept here.  Can I not take a drive for 
pleasure, at a careful rate of speed, even though this endangers pedestrians to a 
slight extent?  Why are they not thereby “subsidizing” me?  After all, they 
might not consent to the risks, nor benefit in any direct way from those risks.  
Moreover, Dworkin’s two principles of dignity are not a promising source for a 
plausible account of what constitutes an “unjust subsidy” in this context. 
One other portion of Dworkin’s analysis deserves attention.  Before 
introducing his formula for permissible risk-imposition, Dworkin places the 
question of liability for unintended harm within an illuminating framework.  
He suggests that we must find some middle ground between the actor always 
paying for the risks he imposes on others (an option that takes away our 
control by burdening our ability to act), and always leaving the cost of the risks 
he imposes on the others (an option that takes away our control by leaving us 
at the risk of being victims).73 
I agree with Dworkin that a middle ground between pervasive liability and 
no liability must be sought.  I also agree that each extreme would result in an 
excessive burden on personal liberty.  But I do not agree that focusing on the 
effect of a liability rule on the actor’s or the victim’s degree of control over his 
life is a helpful way to determine the permissible scope of risk-imposition, for 
two reasons.  First, it is dubious that “maximizing control”74 is the only or even 
 
71 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 132, 177).  Elsewhere in Justice for Hedgehogs, 
Dworkin’s analysis of what political justice does and does not require implicitly employs 
the idea of an unjust or undeserved subsidy.  See id. (manuscript at 221-27). 
72 For discussions of this topic in the context of unconstitutional conditions, see Seth 
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1293, 1294-300 (1984); Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats, and 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 289, 292-94 (1989); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV L. REV. 1413, 1415-19 (1989). 
73 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 186).  For an analysis along similar lines from a 
prominent tort scholar suggesting that tort law balances the interests in liberty and security, 
see Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 382-84 (1996). 
74 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 186) (“My goal is to maximize my control; that 
is what my ethical responsibility for my own life demands.”).  It is surprising that 
Dworkin’s criterion here employs “maximization,” since his purpose is to supply an 
alternative to the utilitarian “maximization of utility” criterion.  Id. (manuscript at 209).  To 
be sure, he wants to maximize “control,” not “utility.”  Still, many nonconsequentialists 
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the most important criterion for determining the defensible middle ground, 
either in morality or law.  For example, whether the risk is fairly distributed is 
also critical, as noted above.  Indeed, even in a purely intrapersonal case in 
which all the advantages and disadvantages of taking the precaution inure to 
the actor (e.g., a hermit is deciding how carefully to build a house that no one 
else will visit), the decision about what level of care to adopt should not 
depend on whether that level will “maximize control.” 
Second, even if control is the proper criterion, I do not see how it entails the 
type of balancing test that Dworkin endorses.  Under Dworkin’s analysis, the 
balancing formula tells us when it is wrong for us not to take more care.75  For 
example, he asserts: “It would destroy my life, not enhance it, if I were to take 
as much care as is possible not to harm others.  I could not even cultivate my 
garden.”76  But the issue of when an actor should compensate for risk is 
distinct from the question of when it is morally permissible to impose that risk.  
It is an open question whether one who permissibly cultivates his garden with 
particular chemicals or a particular irrigation method should nevertheless pay 
for the harm that he thereby causes.  Strict liability, which Dworkin does not 
discuss, is a liability option, one that the Anglo-American common law 
occasionally employs.  And if the strict liability rule that is adopted will only 
rarely result in liability, it need not be especially burdensome, and thus need 
not significantly affect the “control” that the actor has over his life.77 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
The last topic to be explored is Dworkin’s attempt to make sense of the 
controversial doctrine of double effect (“DDE”).  Under this deontological 
doctrine, intentionally causing harm (either as a means or as an end) is more 
difficult to justify than knowingly causing the same harm as a side effect of 
what one intends.78  Consequentialists, of course, would not draw such a 
distinction, but would instead focus on whether the action taken minimized net 
harm, without regard to whether the actor intended the harm or merely knew 
 
criticize any form of maximization. 
Moreover, why does Dworkin focus here on “control”?  Perhaps this is a result of his 
analysis of free will earlier in the book, see id. (manuscript at 137-60), or of his anti-
subjugation principle, which I discuss in the next section.  But it is unwise to employ an 
undifferentiated concept of “control” in all of these contexts.  Distinct conceptions of 
“control” are actually at work. 
75 Id. (manuscript at 186-87). 
76 Id. (manuscript at 186). 
77 Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and Traditional Strict Liability: 
Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2009).  
Similarly, the fact that almost all tort liability is insurable means that even a very expansive 
negligence or strict liability rule need not be a severe burden on actors. 
78 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 187-88).  In some versions of DDE, 
intentionally causing harm is categorically forbidden.  Id (manuscript at 187). 
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that it would occur.79 
Here are two of Dworkin’s supposed illustrations of DDE: 
(1) Liver transplant: 
(a)It is permissible for a doctor to save one of two patients who each 
need a liver, when only one liver is available, even though he knows 
that the other patient will thereby die; but 
(b)It is not permissible for a doctor to kill an elderly patient who will 
die of his illness in a few weeks, for the purpose of extracting his liver 
to save another patient, one with a much greater life expectancy, who 
will otherwise die.80 
(2) Trolley: 
(a) It is permissible to turn a runaway trolley headed towards five 
people who lie immobilized on the track, even though the actor knows 
that by turning the trolley onto a spur, he will cause the death of one 
person who lies immobilized on the spur; but 
(b) It is not permissible, if no spur exists, to throw onto the track a 
large stranger who is fortuitously passing by and whose bulk suffices 
to stop the trolley from killing the five.81 
After pointing out that deontologists have not had an easy time justifying 
DDE,82 Dworkin asserts that his principles of dignity both explain these 
illustrations and offer a persuasive justification for DDE.  Alas, neither 
assertion is convincing. 
According to Dworkin, his second principle of dignity forbids one person 
from imposing a decision on another person about how that other person’s life, 
person, or property should be put to the service of others.83  If you divert the 
trolley onto the spur and cause the death of one rather than five, he says, you 
do not “impose a decision” in that impermissible way; but if you push the fat 
 
79 See JORAM GRAF HABER, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS 10 (1994) 
(“[C]onsequentialists hardly think kindly of the D.D.E. convinced as they are that 
consequences alone determine right conduct.”). 
80 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 187-88). 
81 Id. (manuscript at 188-91).  The trolley problem was introduced by Philippa Foot.  See 
PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES 
AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 23-31 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002) 
(1978).  Judith Jarvis Thomson made the problem famous.  See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The 
Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395-415 (1985). 
82 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 189) (“[Some] philosophers say that it is 
always wrong to aim at someone’s death no matter what the gain.  That explains our 
reactions to the transplant and trolley examples, they say . . . .  But that explanation simply 
restates the problem.  If someone’s motives are good – to save as many people as possible – 
why should it matter whether he actually aims at the death of a smaller number or simply 
knowingly produces their death?”). 
83 See id. (manuscript at 133-34). 
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man into the path of the trolley so that his body serves as a brake, you 
improperly “impose a decision” on him.84 
But this anti-usurpation argument fails, both descriptively and normatively.  
Although some private interpersonal moral duties not to interfere with 
another’s rights do rest on the other’s right to make an autonomous decision,85 
the type of cases we are considering are not within this category.  In both 
trolley scenarios, the actor ignores the victim’s likely (or even expressed) 
wishes.  Thus, suppose the actor can reach the person on the spur by cell 
phone; it is doubtful that turning the trolley is permissible only if that person 
verbally consents.  What distinguishes the two trolley cases is not any 
difference in whether the actor imposed his decision on an unwilling victim, 
but instead differences in the actor’s causal responsibility for the harm, or in 
the nature of his commitment to harming or involving the victim.86 
At several points, Dworkin does hint at such deeper differences.  For 
example, he frames the question as whether the actor imposed a decision 
“about whether and how [the victim’s] life should be put at the service of 
others.”87  In another instructive passage, Dworkin states: 
Of course you are not entitled to take even small risks with my children’s 
lives for the thrill of it.  But you are entitled to drive with normal care in 
my street even though this measurably increases the risk of harm to them.  
The difference explains much else: warring nations may be entitled to 
bomb enemy munitions factories knowing that innocent civilians will be 
blown apart.  My children playing in the street and civilians living near 
enemy factories are in the wrong place at the wrong time; they suffer bad 
luck if they are harmed but no one has judged that it is desirable that they 
should suffer it.88  
But in both of these passages, Dworkin’s language merely restates, rather 
than solves, the problem of how to justify DDE.  The first passage hints that 
using someone as a means is what is especially troubling.  The second hints 
that intention to harm is the morally relevant feature.  Each passage reinforces 
the point that the anti-usurpation principle alone is not the operative 
principle.89 
 
84 See id. (manuscript at 188-91). 
85 One example is a doctor’s duty not to provide medical care to a patient unless she has 
the patient’s consent.  Id. (manuscript at 189). 
86 The person turning the trolley merely diverts the path of a threatening object; but the 
person pushing the fat man is committed to using or appropriating the victim’s body as a 
mean to the end of saving the five.  For two recent, valuable discussions that try to refine 
and more deeply justify this distinction, see F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE HARM 138-76 (2007); T.M. SCANLON, MORAL 
DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 18-20 (2008). 
87 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 191) (emphasis added). 
88 Id. (manuscript at 189-90) (emphasis added). 
89 Dworkin at one point suggests that what is impermissible is relying on a justification 
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Dworkin does offer one other formulation that purports to distinguish the 
(permissible harm) “turning of the trolley” case from (impermissible harm) 
cases of true usurpation: “[W]hat is forbidden in all these cases [of 
impermissible usurpation] is not that someone’s body be invaded or harmed 
but that this be done in service of a judgment about how his body should be 
used.”90  But this criterion also fails to explain the different outcomes.  If “a 
judgment about how his body should be used”91 means “an (impermissible) 
judgment that his body must be used as a means or end rather than side-effect,” 
then this merely restates and does not justify DDE.  However, if that phrase 
means “an (impermissible) judgment that the victim will not endorse about 
how his body will be used,” the criterion fails to distinguish means and ends 
from side-effects at all, because in all of these scenarios, the injured victim 
might well object to the ultimate judgment that his welfare must be sacrificed 
for the sake of a larger good. 
To be sure, Dworkin’s legitimate concern to preserve autonomy, and 
specifically to preclude others from unjustifiably usurping a decision, has 
genuine traction in the context of political morality.92  It is indeed especially 
troublesome when the government overrides the choices of its citizens, not just 
because the government thereby seeks to avoid harm to others or to provide 
social benefits, but because the government rejects on the merits the morally 
permissible choice that the citizen exercises.  As Dworkin explains: 
Even those who believe that pregnant women should have themselves 
 
that “suppose[s] my right to decide what it is desirable should happen to you.”  Id. 
(manuscript at 190) (emphasis added).  But this broad criterion, too, is unpersuasive.  Even 
in the scenario where the actor turns the trolley, this criterion is, in one sense, satisfied: we 
believe that the state of affairs in which the trolley is turned is a better state of affairs, from 
either a deontological or consequentialist perspective, than the state of affairs in which it is 
not turned.  Yet this is not the same as deciding that it is desirable that the person on the 
spur should die or be harmed.  And, on a narrower understanding of the criterion, even 
pushing the fat man does not satisfy it.  The actor choosing that unfortunately necessary 
means to the end might greatly regret that he must use this harmful alternative.  And again, 
it is not the case that the actor who pushes the victim has decided that the best use of the 
victim’s life is to sacrifice him to save five.  Rather, the actor has decided to use the victim’s 
body, and presumably would be delighted if the victim survived. 
Notice, finally, that the likelihood that harm will ensue is not the decisive consideration in 
deciding which of the courses of actions is morally permissible.  Even if the fat man has 
only a 50% chance of dying, while the person on the spur in the diverted trolley scenario 
would have a 90% chance, using the fat man’s body as a brake arguably is impermissible 
while diverting the trolley is not. 
90 Id. (manuscript at 189). 
91 Id. 
92 See id.  It also has importance in the context of personal ethics.  See id. (manuscript at 
133) (“We cannot escape influence, but authenticity [the second principle of dignity] 
requires us to resist domination.  The distinction is of great ethical importance: it is the 
difference between limitation and subordination.”). 
 118 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:ppp 
 
tested so that a defective fetus might be saved by medical intervention 
would be horrified if such tests and intervention were mandatory.  People 
have a right . . . that nothing be done to them that supposes that they are 
not the final judges of how their bodies should be used.93 
But Dworkin is on treacherous ground when he takes this plausible duty of 
government not to usurp the decisions of its citizens and extrapolates it to the 
domain of interpersonal moral duty, the duty of one private person to another.  
The anti-usurpation principle is much less relevant in this domain, for two 
reasons.  First, private persons rarely have power over the decisions of others 
that is remotely comparable to the power of government over its citizenry.  
And second, private individuals ordinarily have the liberty to act for a wide 
variety of reasons, including disagreement with the (morally permissible) 
views, lifestyles, or life projects of other private individuals.  It is morally 
permissible for me to befriend only those who share my political views, or to 
shun starving artists or wealthy hedge-fund traders, but it is certainly not 
legitimate for the government to rely on such criteria in deciding who may use 
or speak in a public park. 
Another problem arises with Dworkin’s use of the second illustration.  The 
trolley problem is not clearly an illustration of DDE at all.  It is not the case 
that an actor who pushes or throws someone in the path of the trolley in order 
to stop its motion must intend to cause death, or even harm, to the involuntary 
human brake.  If the victim happens to be wearing indestructible garb that 
protects him from any physical harm, that would hardly set back the actor’s 
plans (so long as the victim’s body will still stop the train).  Thus, it is not the 
case that the actor must have intended to harm the victim.94  In passing, 
Dworkin implicitly recognizes this notorious problem with individuating 
intentions.  For example, he describes the “thrown bystander” variation as a 
case in which “you throw one person onto the single track intending that he be 
struck”;95 Dworkin does not say, “intending that he die or be injured.”  And in 
another scenario, in which an actor shoots another in order to obtain a needed 
medicine, Dworkin acknowledges that what is really necessary to achieve the 
actor’s end is (merely) that the victim “be in some way immobilized,”96 not 
that the victim be killed or physically harmed.97 
 
93 Id. (manuscript at 189). 
94 Even in the liver transplant example, arguably the death of the elderly patient need not 
be intended.  The doctor could anesthetize the patient, remove his liver, and then hope 
against hope that the patient miraculously survives.  But many deontologists would concede 
that in this type of case, what the doctor does intend to do (remove a liver from a patient 
who needs it to survive) is “close enough” to intending the patient’s death that it should be 
so considered for purposes of DDE. 
95 Id. (manuscript at 188) (emphasis added). 
96 Id. (manuscript at 189). 
97 Dworkin pairs this example of an impermissible harming with an example of a 
permissible harming that results in the same consequence, the death of the other.  Dworkin 
 2010] TWO PRINCIPLES OF DIGNITY 119 
 
Consider one final argument that Dworkin offers for the anti-usurpation 
approach.  If we switch from an ex post to an ex ante perspective on the liver 
transplant problem, we could imagine that a group of individuals agree in 
advance to a utilitarian “spare parts lottery”: they agree to a later involuntary 
reallocation of human organs whenever this would produce a net saving of 
lives.98  Why, Dworkin asks, is such an agreement still troubling and not 
enforceable?99  The reason, he suggests, is that under the agreement you give 
others authority to make basic decisions about your life when the time comes 
for an organ transplant.100  Indeed, Dworkin says, in this respect, enforcing the 
agreement is akin to enforcing an agreement in which you sell yourself into 
slavery.101 
This argument, though initially attractive, is overstated.  We do sometimes 
permit individuals to irrevocably give up their right to decide how their bodies 
may be used.  If you sign up for the Army and later, before your tour is up, 
change your mind about exposing yourself to physical harm, you will suffer a 
significant legal sanction.  Or if you agree to play professional football but 
later decide that the rewards no longer justify the risks of physical injury, you 
will suffer a financial burden for exercising that choice.  Still, Dworkin is 
correct that a “spare parts lottery” agreement should not be enforced.  But the 
better explanation for this result is not a broad anti-subjugation principle, but 
instead a narrower principle, that consent does not override all deontological 
rights and duties. 
In sum, Dworkin’s anti-usurpation principle, while it indeed flows from his 
second principle of dignity, does not help justify DDE or any plausible variant 
of DDE.  (Nor does it justify the distinction between killing and letting die, 
despite Dworkin’s assertion that it does.)102  Whether the victim has been fully 
 
supposes that the actor and the other both need the medicine to survive a rattlesnake bite, 
and the actor merely outruns the other and thus secures the medicine for himself, realizing, 
however, that this will cause the other to die.  See id. (manuscript at 183).  Note that in this 
example, as in the trolley and liver transplant examples, what is problematic is not that the 
actor improperly supposes that he is the final judge of how another’s body or welfare should 
be used.  In both cases, the actor decides to save himself knowing that this will be at the cost 
of the life of another.  If the actor needing the medicine knows that he is very likely to 
outrace the other, his choice to race and secure the medicine for himself does not, in any 
meaningful sense, preserve the other actor’s right to decide for himself whether his life will 
be lost. 
98 See id. (manuscript at 188-89). 
99 Id. (manuscript at 189). 
100 Id. (manuscript at 191). 
101 Id. 
102 Dworkin asserts that the distinctions between killing and letting die, and between 
deliberate harm and the harm that occurs as a result of legitimate competition, also are 
explained by the anti-usurpation principle.  Id. (manuscript at 183-86).  Referring to the 
rattlesnake bite scenario noted earlier, see supra note 97, Dworkin claims that there is an 
important moral difference between killing someone to obtain a needed medicine and 
 120 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:ppp 
 
consulted, and whether the actor has made a decision that overrides the 
victim’s judgment, are sometimes relevant, even decisive, considerations in 
political morality.  But only rarely are they prominent features of the 
topography of interpersonal moral duties. 
CONCLUSION 
Dworkin plausibly rejects consequentialist accounts of interpersonal moral 
duties.  But the principles of dignity that he offers instead are an inadequate 
alternative account.  His general analysis of the duty to rescue justifies an 
unduly weak duty.  Although Dworkin would enlarge that duty when the 
victim is identifiable or proximate, his argument for that enlargement is itself 
insufficient.  Dworkin’s analysis of the duty not to create an unreasonable risk 
of harm encounters similar problems.  By emphasizing the subjective 
importance of the actor’s personal projects, he does not adequately constrain 
the actor’s risky conduct, and he implausibly frames the question of 
permissible risk-imposition as a question of what liability rule will “maximize 
the control” of actors and victims.  Finally, in his analysis of the deontological 
doctrine of double effect, Dworkin invokes an anti-usurpation principle that 
protects autonomous decision-making.  But this principle fails to explain and 
justify the distinction between intending harm as a means or an end, and 
knowingly causing harm as a side effect of what one intends. 
Dworkin’s “interpretive” account103 of interpersonal moral duties is 
 
competing in a race for the medicine with that person: 
But any general transfer of control over the integrity of my body, particularly to those 
who do not have my interests at heart, would leave my dignity in shreds.  Only when 
we recognize that connection between dignity and bodily control can we understand 
why killing someone is intuitively horrifying when letting him die, even out of the 
same motive as we might have for killing him, is not.   
Id. (manuscript at 185). 
This argument flounders in ways that we have already encountered.  Usurpation or 
control is not the morally relevant difference in these cases.  Note, first, that the 
wrongfulness of killing someone (as opposed to letting someone die) often has nothing to do 
with the victim’s lack of conscious control.  A bomb can kill instantly, and thus not affect 
the victim’s ability to control his fate; a failure to save a victim from drowning can result in 
the victim helplessly flailing in the water for a considerable period of time, and thus 
measurably compromise his control over his fate.  Moreover, a particular killing method 
could permit the victim some degree of control, and yet the method could thereby be more, 
not less, horrifying and morally blameworthy.  Thus, suppose murderer Marv places you 
into a contraption that permits you the choice of killing yourself sooner or dying more 
slowly and painfully.  Murderer Max simply kills you suddenly.  It is not obvious that Max, 
by taking away your control, is more blameworthy, but that is what Dworkin’s analysis 
suggests. 
103 Dworkin purports to address the problems with a consequentialist account of 
interpersonal moral duties within his comprehensive “interpretive” perspective.  Id. 
(manuscript at 79-119).  I have not addressed his interpretive strategy in this Comment.  
However, I believe that that perspective is much more suitable to understanding legal 
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inadequate, but I do not suggest that it is without value.  His analysis provides 
numerous inventive examples that powerfully illuminate the difference 
between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist explanations.  Moreover, 
many of his arguments are plausible components of a nonconsequentialist 
account – for example, his emphasis on whether a liberty (or harm) implicates 
the personal plans or projects of the actor (or victim), and his attention to 
autonomy and subordination.  However, some of the most difficult issues, 
especially the question of how to justify attention to consequences within a 
largely deontological or nonconsequentialist perspective, are more 
convincingly analyzed by other moral and legal philosophers.104 
 
 
practice, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986), than to solving the problems 
of metaethics, reconciling free will and responsibility, or justifying moral duties. 
104 See KAMM, supra note 86, at 91-224; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 
149-294 (1974); SCANLON, supra note 86, at 89-121; Larry Alexander, Deontology at the 
Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 893-912 (2000); Michael S. Moore, Patrolling the 
Borders of Consequentialist Justifications: The Scope of Agent-Relative Obligations, 27 L. 
& PHIL. 35, 35-96 (2007); Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 3-39 
(1982).  See generally Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2008), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ethics-deontological (discussing the 
relationship between deontological and consequentialist norms). 
